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Abstract. One way to analyze Cyber-Physical Systems is by modeling
them as hybrid automata. Since reachability analysis for hybrid nonlinear
automata is a very challenging and computationally expensive problem,
in practice, engineers try to solve the requirements falsification problem.
In one method, the falsification problem is solved by minimizing a ro-
bustness metric induced by the requirements. This optimization problem
is usually a non-convex non-smooth problem that requires heuristic and
analytical guidance to be solved. In this paper, functional gradient de-
scent for hybrid systems is utilized for locally decreasing the robustness
metric. The local descent method is combined with Simulated Annealing
as a global optimization method to search for unsafe behaviors.
Keywords: Falsification; Hybrid systems; Optimization.
1 Introduction
In the last three decades, we have come to expect that we will be transported
safely, reliably, and efficiently. Technologically, we have reached this point by
increasingly adding sensors and embedded computers in ground vehicles, air-
planes, and locomotives. However, as the software complexity increases so does
the number of catastrophic software bugs. Therefore, Model-Based Development
(MBD) and auto-coding technologies are currently used as the preferred develop-
ment method for reducing errors [1]. Another benefit of MBD is that the system
efficiency can be analyzed and optimized even before any prototypes are built.
Even though MBD can reduce coding errors, it may not necessarily reduce
system design errors with respect to functional requirements. This is particu-
larly pronounced in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) where computer software
interacts with and controls the physical environment. In order to analyze the
safety of such systems, a variety of software tools have been developed for var-
ious classes of systems when the requirements concern reachable states in the
system [2,3]. Nevertheless, when the system is complex in both the software and
the physical dynamics, and the requirements have spatiotemporal constraints,
e.g., as expressed in Metric [4] or Signal [5] Temporal Logic (TL), then current
reachability analysis methods cannot provide an answer.
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In order to address the need of providing real-time analysis of the behavior of
such systems, a variety of search-based falsification methods has been developed
(for a survey see [6]). In search based falsification methods, the working assump-
tion is that there is a design error in the system, and the goal of the falsifier is to
search and detect system behaviors that invalidate (falsify) the system require-
ments. Among search-based methods, multiple shooting optimization techniques
[7,8] have shown great promise with a modest preprocessing stage, but still they
cannot handle temporal logic requirements. Hence, tree search methods [9] and
single shooting TL robustness guided approaches [10] remain the state of the art
in TL falsification. More recently, in [11], it was demonstrated that combining
tree search based methods with TL robustness can improve the falsification de-
tection rate in certain problem instances. In brief, different falsification methods
are still needed for different problem instances.
In this paper, we continue the progress on improving single shooting falsifi-
cation methods for TL specifications [10]. This class of methods is guided by
evaluating how robustly a system trajectory satisfies a TL specification [12,13].
Positive values mean that the system trajectory satisfies the specification, while
non positive values mean that the specification has been falsified by the system
trajectory. Single shooting falsification methods sample one or multiple system
trajectories for the whole duration of the test time, they evaluate the TL robust-
ness of each trajectory, and, then, they decide where to sample next in the search
space. Ideally, at each iteration, the proposed new samples will produce trajecto-
ries with TL robustness less than the previously sampled trajectories. However,
in general, this cannot be guaranteed unless some information is available about
the structure of the system. In [14], it was shown that given a trajectory of a
non-autonomous smooth non-linear dynamical system and a TL specification, it
is possible to compute a direction in the search space along which the system
will produce trajectories with reduced TL robustness. This direction is referred
to as descent direction for TL robustness.
Our main contribution in this paper is that we extend the results of [14] to
computing local descent directions for falsification of TL specifications for hybrid
systems. The extension is nontrivial since as discussed later in the paper, the
sensitivity analysis is challenging in the case of hybrid systems. In particular,
we focus on hybrid automata [15,16] with non-linear dynamics in each mode
and external inputs (non-autonomous systems). Hybrid automata [15,16] is a
mathematical model which can capture a wide range of CPS. We also present
several examples of hybrid automata for which we can compute such descent
directions for TL specifications. We remark that the descent directions computed
can only point toward local reduction of TL robustness. Hence, we propose
combining descent direction computations with a stochastic optimization engine
in order to improve the overall system falsification rate.
We highlight that the contributions of this paper have some important im-
plications. First and foremost, it should be possible to derive results for ap-
proximating the descent direction for hybrid systems without requiring explicit
knowledge of the system dynamics. For example, in [17], we showed that this is
possible for smooth non-linear dynamical systems by using a number of succes-
sive linearizations along the system trajectory. The method was applied directly
to Simulink models. Second, the local descent computation method could be
further improved by utilizing recent results on a smooth approximation of TL
robustness [18]. Therefore, the results in this paper could eventually lead to
testing methods which do not require explicit knowledge of the system dynam-
ics, and could be applied directly to a very large class of models, e.g., Simulink
models, without the need for model translations or symbolic model extraction.
2 Problem Statement
In order to formalize the problem that we deal with in this paper, we will describe
the system under test and also the system requirements in this section.
2.1 System Description
Hybrid automaton (HA) is a model that facilitates specification and verifi-
cation of hybrid systems [16]. A hybrid automaton is specified using a tuple
H = (H,H0, U, Inv, E , Σ), where H = L ×X denotes the ‘hybrid’ discrete and
continuous state spaces of H: L ⊂ N is the set of discrete states or locations
that the system switches through (each location attributes different continuous
dynamics to the system), and X ⊆ Rn is the continuous state space of the sys-
tem, H0 = L0 ×X0 ⊆ H is the set of initial conditions, U is a bounded subset
of Rm that indicates the input signals ranges, Inv : L → 2X×R+ assigns an
invariant set to each location, E is a set of tuples (E,Gu,Re) that determine
transitions between locations. Here, E ⊆ L × L is the set of control switches,
Gu : E → 2X×R+ is the guard condition that enables a control switch (i.e, the
system switches from li to lj when (x(t), t) ∈ X ×R+ satisfies Gu((li, lj))) and,
Re : E × X → X is a reset map that given a transition e ∈ E and a point x
for which Gu(e) is satisfied, maps x to a point in the state space X. Finally, Σ
defines the continuous dynamics in each location l ∈ L:
Σ(l) : x˙ = Fl(x, u(t), t), x ∈ X, ∀t : u(t) ∈ U (1)
where x˙ = dxdt , x ∈ X is the system continuous state, and u : [0, T ] → U is the
input signal map which is chosen from the set of all possible input signals U [0,T ]
whose value at time t is denoted as u(t). Also, ∀l ∈ L, Fl : X×U ×R+ → R is a
C1 flow that represents the system dynamics at location l. For more information
about hybrid systems please refer to [15] and [16].
A hybrid trajectory η(h0, u(t), t) starting from a point h0 = (l0, x0) ∈ H0 and
under the input u ∈ U [0,T ] is a function η : H0 × U × R+ → H which points to
a pair (control location, state vector) for each point in time: η(h0, u(t), t) =
(l(h0, u(t), t), s(h0, u(t), t)), where l(h0, u(t), t) is the location at time t, and
s(h0, u(t), t) is the continuous state at time t.
We write the dynamical equations for the continuous system trajectory as:
s(x0, u(0), 0) = x0
ds(x0, u(t), t)
dt
= Fl(s(x0, u(t), t), u(t), t) while (s(x0, u(t), t), t) ∈ Inv(l) (2)
s(x0, u(t), t
+) = Re((li, lj), s(x, u(t), t
−)) if
{
(s(x0, u(t), t
−), t) ∈ Gu((li, lj))
(s(x0, u(t), t
+), t) ∈ Inv(lj) (3)
If the point (s(x0, u(t), t
+), t) lies outside Inv(lj), there is an error in the design.
We assume that such errors do not exist in the system. The times in which
the location l and consequently the right-hand side of the equation (2) changes,
are called transition times. In order to avoid unnecessary technicalities, in the
above equations we use the notation of [19] and denote transition times as t−
and t+, where t− is the time right before the transition and t+ is the time right
after that. However in more technical analysis of hybrid systems, one needs to
consider the notion of hybrid time explained in [20] where a hybrid trajectory is
parametrized not only by the physical time but also by the number of discrete
jumps. When we consider the trajectory in a compact time interval [0, T ] and η
is not Zeno1, the sequence of transition times is finite.
Assumption 1 We assume our system is deterministic, it does not exhibit Zeno
behaviors and given (h0, u) there is a unique solution η(h0, u(t), t) to the system.
Remark 1. The input signal map u, should be represented using a combination
of finitely many basis functions. In this paper we use piecewise constant signals.
2.2 System Requirements
Temporal logic formulas formally capture requirements concerning the system
behavior. They could be expressing the requirements over Boolean abstractions
of the behavior using atomic propositions as in MTL [4], or directly through
predicate expressions over the signals as in STL [5]. Since the differences are
only syntactic in nature (see [21]), in the following, we will just be using the
term Temporal Logics (TL) to refer to either logic.
TL formulas are formal logical statements that indicate how a system should
behave and are built by combining atomic propositions (AP) or predicates using
logical and temporal operators. The logical operators typically consist of con-
junction (∧), disjunction (∨), negation (¬), and implication (→), while temporal
operators include eventually (3I), always (2I) and until (UI) where the index
I indicates a time interval. For example, the specification: “The absolute value
of the trajectory s, should never go beyond α” can be captured using the TL
formula 2(|s| ≤ α), or the timed specification “The value of the signal s should
reach the bound (sref ±5%) within δ seconds and stay there afterwards” can be
formulated as 3[0,δ](2(|(s− sref )/sref | < 5%)).
1 η is Zeno if it does an infinite number of jumps in a finite amount of time. A hybrid
system is Zeno if at least one of its trajectories is Zeno.
The robustness of a trajectory η(x0, u, t) with respect to a TL formula is a
function of that trajectory which shows how well it satisfies the specification (see
[13] for details on how the robustness is defined and calculated). The function
creates a positive value when the requirement is satisfied and a negative value
otherwise. Its magnitude quantifies how far the specification is from being sat-
isfied for non-positive values, or falsified for non-negative values. Software tools
such as S-TaLiRo [22] compute the robustness value of a TL formula given a
trajectory η(x0, u, t). In order to detect unsafe system behaviors, we should fal-
sify the specification, which means we need to find trajectories with non-positive
robustness values. As a result, in a search based falsification, the effort is put on
reducing the robustness value by searching in the parameter space.
It can be easily shown that given a TL formula φ and a trajectory η(h0, u, t)
of a hybrid automaton H that satisfies the specification, if Assumption 1 holds,
then there exists a critical time t∗ ∈ [0, T ] and a critical atomic proposition
(or critical predicate) p∗ with respect to which the robustness is evaluated [23].
For example, in practice, the tool S-TaLiRo [22] computes the critical time t∗
and atomic proposition p∗ along with the robustness value of the specification.
Reducing the distance of the trajectory η(h0, u, t) from the set defined by p
∗ at
the critical time instance t∗ will not increase the robustness value; and in most
practical cases it will actually decrease it. As a consequence, the TL falsification
problem can be locally converted into a safety problem, i.e, always avoid the
unsafe set U defined by p∗. Hence, we need to compute a descent vector (h′0, u′)
that will decrease the distance between η(h′0, u
′, t∗) and the unsafe set U .
2.3 Problem Formulation
Let HU ⊆ H denote the system unsafe set, if η(h0, u(t), t) enters HU then system
specification is falsified. To avoid a digression into unnecessary technicalities, we
will assume that, both the set of initial conditions and the unsafe set are each
included in a single control location, i.e, H0 = {l0} ×X0, and HU = {lU} × U ,
where l0, lU ∈ L, and X0,U ⊆ X.
Definition 1. Let DHU : H 7→ R+ be the distance function to HU , defined by
DHU ((l, x)) =
{
dU (x) if l = lU
+∞ otherwise (4)
where dU (x) = infu∈U ||x− u||.
Given a compact time interval [0, T ], h0 ∈ H0, and the system input u ∈
U [0,T ], we define the robustness of the system trajectory η(h0, u(t), t) as
f(h0, u) , min
0≤t≤T
DHU (η(h0, u(t), t)) (5)
and the respective critical time as t∗ = argmint∈[0,T ]DHU (η(h0, u(t), t)). Since
all trajectories start at l = l0, we will write f(h0, u) as f(w) where w = (x0, u).
Trajectories of minimal robustness indicate potentially unsafe behaviors, and if
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Fig. 1: 2-stage falsification: The stochastic search will search for the global opti-
mizer while the local search improve the search speed.
we can reduce the robustness value to zero, we have a falsifying trajectory. As
a result robustness value should be minimized with respect to w. Our problem
can be formulated generally as follows:
minimize f(w) such that w ∈ X0 × U [0,T ] (6)
Finding falsifying trajectories can be done in 2 stages. In the first stage, a
higher level stochastic sampler determines a hybrid trajectory -a sequence of
locations and state vectors- that exhibits system’s potential bad behavior, and
in the second stage, out of all the neighboring trajectories that follow the same
sequence of locations, we find the trajectory of minimal robustness (see Fig (1)).
This can be done using local minimization. In this paper, we focus on solving
the problem in this stage: we will find the trajectory of minimum robustness in
the neighboring of a previously created trajectory in the first stage.
Before we address our special problem of interest we should impose further
assumptions on our system stated below:
1. The system is observable, i.e. we have access to all the system states, or we
have a state estimator which is able to estimate them.
2. In the local search stage, we always are able to find a neighboring tube
around each trajectory such that none of the trajectories inside that tube
hit the guard tangentially. This ensures that trajectories of the system H
starting close enough to x0 and under neighboring inputs of u undergo sim-
ilar transitions/switches. In hybrid systems analysis, this property is called
trajectory robustness (not to be confused with trajectory robustness in this
paper) and is guaranteed if we can find an auto-bisimulation function of a
trajectory and the trajectories starting from its neighboring initial conditions
and under neighboring inputs [24].
3. The system is deterministic and the transitions are taken as soon as possible.
In order to have a deterministic system, if two transitions happen from the
same location, their Guards should be mutually exclusive.
4. Guards are of the form g(x, t) = 0 and Reset maps are functions of the form
x′ = h(x), where g and h are C1 functions. For all the states that satisfy a
Guard condition the corresponding Reset map should satisfy ∂h∂x
∣∣
x
6= 0.
5. The trajectory η(h0, u(t), t) returned by the first stage, from which we de-
scend, enters the location of the unsafe set.
The last assumption is made so that our problem be well-defined (note that
the objective function (5) will have finite value only if trajectory enters unsafe
location). The task of finding such an initial condition h0 is delegated to the
higher-level stochastic search algorithm within which our method is integrated
(Fig. 1). If finding such a trajectory for the higher-level stochastic algorithm
is hard, we can still improve our trajectories locally by descending toward the
guards. This will be discussed more in the next section.
The problem is addressed in the following:
Problem 1. Given a hybrid automaton H, a compact time interval [0, T ], a set of
initial conditions H0 ⊆ H, a set of inputs U [0,T ], a point h0 = (l0, x0) ∈ H0 and
an input u ∈ U [0,T ] such that the system trajectory satisfies 0 < f(w) < +∞,
find a vector dw = (dx0, du) ∈ X × U [0,T ] that satisfies the following property:
∃∆1, ∆2 ∈ R+ such that ∀δ1 ∈ (0, ∆1), δ2 ∈ (0, ∆2), h′0 = (l0, x0 + δ1dx0) ∈
H0 and u
′ = u+ δ2du ∈ U [0,T ], η(h′0, u′(t), t) undergoes the same transitions as
η(h0, u(t), t), and also f(w + δdw) ≤ f(w) where δ = min{δ1, δ2}.
Finding such a descent direction can help improve the performance of stochas-
tic algorithms [10] that intend to solve the general problem in Eq. (6).
Note that for the piecewise constant inputs u that we are working with in this
paper, du is also a piecewise constant signal whose variables should be computed.
Variables of du show the desired changes in that of the input signal u.
3 Finding a descent direction for the robustness
In this section, given a trajectory η(h0, u(t), t), we find dx0 and du such that
the trajectory η(h′0, u
′(t), t), where h′0 = (l0, x0 + δdx0), u
′(t) = u(t) + δdu(t),
attains a smaller robustness value; i.e f(w′) = f(x′0, u
′) < f(x0, u) = f(w). The
robustness function in Eq. (5) is hard to deal with as it is non differentiable
and non convex [23]. To solve this issue we calculate the descent direction with
respect to a convex, almost everywhere differentiable function, and show that
decreasing the value of this function yields a decrease in the robustness function:
Theorem 1. Let x0, x
′
0 ∈ X0, u, u′ ∈ U [0,T ], and assume that the critical time
for the continuous part of the hybrid trajectory s , s(x0, u(t), t), is t∗. Define
J(x′0, u
′) =
{‖s(x′0, u′(t∗), t∗)− z(x0, u(t∗), t∗)‖ if l = lU
+∞ otherwise (7)
where l is the first argument of η(h′0, u
′(t∗), t∗), and
z(x0, u(t), t) = argminz∈U‖z − s(x0, u(t), t)‖. (8)
If we find a trajectory s′ , s(x′0, u′(t), t) such that J(x′0, u′) < J(x0, u), then the
robustness of the trajectory s′ is smaller than that of s, i.e: f(x′0, u
′) < f(x0, u).
Proof. By Eq. (5) we have f(x′0, u
′) = min
0≤t≤T
DHU (η(h
′
0, u
′(t), t)) ≤ J(x′0, u′) <
J(x0, u) = f(x0, u). 
Let x′0 = x0 + dx and u
′ = u+ du. Consider J at the unsafe location and define:
J(x′0, u
′) = G(s(x′0, u
′(t∗), t∗)), (9)
where G(x) = ‖x − z(x0, u(t∗), t∗)‖. Notice that the definition of G is based
on a primary trajectory from which we want to descend. The total difference
of a multi variable function shows the change in its value with respect to the
changes in its independent variables while its partial differential is its derivative
with respect to one variable, while others are kept constant. In the following,
dx and du are calculated using the chain rule, such that J(x′0, u
′) − J(x0, u) =
J(x0 + dx, u+ du)− J(x0, u) = dJ(x0, u) < 0:
dJ(x0, u; dx, du) =
∂G
∂x
T
ds(x0, u, t
∗) (10)
where ∂G∂x ,
∂G
∂x
∣∣
s(x0,u(t∗),t∗)
∈ Rn×1 is the steepest direction that increases
distance from the unsafe set, i.e, −∂G∂x is along the approach vector mentioned
in [23] that shows the direction of the shortest distance between s(x0, u(t
∗), t∗)
and the unsafe set. Now observe that:
ds(x0, u, t
∗) = D1s(x0, u, t∗)dx0 +D2s(x0, u, t∗)du (11)
where Di denotes the partial differentiation with respect to the i
th argument (for
instance D1s =
∂s
∂x0
). Here, D1s(x0, u, t
∗) and D2s(x0, u, t∗) are the sensitivity
of the trajectory to the initial condition and input at time t∗, respectively. In the
next section we show how to calculate sensitivity for a hybrid trajectory. Using
Eq. (10) and (11), we choose:
dx0 = −c1(∂G
∂x
T
D1s(x0, u, t
∗))T , du = −c2(∂G
∂x
T
D2s(x0, u, t
∗))T (12)
for some c1, c2 > 0. As a result, we have dJ(x0, u) = −c1|| ∂s∂x0
T ∂G
∂x ||2−c2|| ∂s∂u
T ∂G
∂x ||2
≤ 0 and the equality holds if and only if ∂s∂x0
∣∣
(x0,u,t∗)
T ∂G
∂x =
∂s
∂u
∣∣
(x0,u,t∗)
T ∂G
∂x = 0.
All the above calculations are based on the assumption that the trajectory
enters the unsafe location, but even if finding a trajectory that enters the unsafe
location using stochastic higher level search is hard, we can still improve trajec-
tories locally by descending toward the guard Gu∗ that takes the trajectory to
the location with the shortest possible path to the unsafe set. This is shown in
Fig. 2. For instance if the guard Gu∗ is activated when g(x) = 0, we can easily
use zero finding methods to find a set M = {x | g(x) = 0} and replace U in all
the previous calculations with the set M .
4 Sensitivity Calculation for a Hybrid Trajectory
Extending sensitivity analysis to the hybrid case is not straightforward and even
in the case that there is no reset in transitions and the state stays continuous, a
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discontinuity often appears in the sensitivity function that needs to be evaluated
[19]. In order to make the results comprehensive, in this section we analyze the
sensitivity for trajectories of a Hybrid automaton. Without loss of generality, in
order to focus on the complexity that happens under transitions, we consider
a hybrid automaton with only two discrete locations (|L| = 2) and one control
switch, also we assume l0 6= lU . There are 2 scenarios:
1. (s(x, u(t), t), t) is either inside Inv(l0) or Inv(lU )
2. (s(x, u(t), t), t) ∈ Gu((l0, lU ))
Let us use px0 and pu to denote the sensitivity of the trajectory to changes in
x0 and u respectively, i.e, px0(t, t0) = D1s(x0, u, t) and pu(t, t0) = D2s(x0, u, t).
It can be shown easily that in the first scenario, while (s(x0, u, t), t) ∈ Inv(li)
and i ∈ {0,U}:
p˙x0(t, t0) = D1Fli(s(x0, u, t), u(t), t).px0(t, t0), (13a)
p˙u(t, t0) = D1Fli(s(x0, u(t), t),u(t), t).pu(t, t0) +D2Fli(s(x0, u(t), t), u(t), t),
(13b)
with the following initial and boundary conditions:
px0(t0, t0) = In×n, pu(t0, t0) = 0, (14a)
px0(τ
+, t0) = rx0 , pu(τ
+, t0) = ru. (14b)
where τ+ is the right hand side limit of the transition time τ that satisfies
(s(x0, u(τ), τ), τ) ∈ Gu((l0, lU )). We will calculate rx0 and ru in the following
subsection. Consider that even if there is no reset, this jump happens in the state
triggered transitions since neighboring trajectories have different transition times
and as a result they are under different dynamics during the time between their
transition times (see Fig. 3).
4.1 Sensitivity Jump Calculation
Assume that if g(s(x0, u(t), t), t) = 0 then (s(x0, u(t), t), t) ∈ Gu((l0, lU )). Let
us denote the transition time by τ(x0, u), which reminds us that this transition
time differs for different trajectories; if the dependence was clear from context,
we will write down τ , for brevity. Assume that Re(x, (l1, l2)) = h(x), we have:
s(x0, u(τ
+), τ+) = h(s(x0, u(τ
−), τ−)) (15)
To calculate the value of px0 at τ
+ we take derivatives with respect to x0 from
the above equation. We have:
ds(x0, u, τ
+)
dx0
=
∂h
∂x
ds(x0, u, τ
−)
dx0
⇒
D1s(x0, u, τ
+) +D3s(x0, u, τ
+)
∂τ
∂x0
=
∂h
∂x
(D1(s(x0, u, τ
−)) +D3s(x0, u, τ
−)
∂τ
∂x0
)
⇒ px0(τ+, t0) = D1s(x0, u, τ+) =
∂h
∂x
px0(τ
−, t0) + (
∂h
∂x
f− − f+)D1τ) (16)
where ∂h∂x =
∂h
∂x
∣∣
s(x0,u(τ−),τ−)
, and f− and f+ are equal to Fl0(s(x0, u(τ
−), τ−),
u(τ−), τ−) and FlU (s(x0, u(τ
+), τ+), u(τ+)), τ+) respectively. To calculate D1τ ,
consider that τ satisfies g(s(x0, u, τ), τ(x0, u)) = 0, taking the derivatives with
respect to x0, we have:
D1g
T (D1s(x0, u, τ) +D3s(x0, u, τ).D1τ) +D2g.D1τ = 0
⇒ D1τ = ∂τ
∂x0
= −D1g
T .px0(τ
−, t0)
D1gT .f− +D2g
(17)
Using similar analysis we have:
pu(τ
+, t0) =
∂h
∂x
pu(τ
−, t0) + (
∂h
∂x
f− − f+)D2τT (18)
D2τ =− D1g
T .pu(τ
−, t0)
D1gT .f− +D2g
(19)
Using a hybrid automaton, sensitivity and system states can be calculated simul-
taneously (see Fig. 4). This will easily let us calculate the sensitivities by reseting
their values at transition times. Note that using equations (16) to (19), for a sys-
tem with time triggered transitions (g(x, t) = g′(t)) whose reset map is identity
(h(x) = x), there are no jumps in sensitivities, i.e, px0(τ
+, t0) = px0(τ
−, t0) and
pu(τ
+, t0) = pu(τ
−, t0). These types of hybrid systems can be handled using our
previous work in [17] where we showed how to use system linearized matrices
to approximately calculate the decent direction. However to have these kinds of
gray box analysis for hybrid systems with state dependent transitions, we also
need to have some information about the guards or be able to approximate them
in order to model the jumps in the sensitivity. In the future we will work on the
descent calculation using gray box models of the general hybrid systems.
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Fig. 4: HA of the system and trajectory sensitivity
Algorithm (1) describes the procedure to find gradient descent (GD) direc-
tions for hybrid systems. The function “Simul&Sens&GetRob” calculates the
sensitivity matrices px0 and pu as well as the robustness value r, the critical time
t∗ and the approach vector ns = ∂G∂x with respect to the specification ϕ. Given
t∗, ns, px0 , pu, “GD” calculates the gradient descent directions dx, du using Eq.
(12). “INBOX” calculates the new initial condition and input while ensuring
that they lie inside the desired sets X0 and U
[0,T ].
5 Experimental Results
In order to show the utility of our method, we used the following three examples
in which we deal with nonlinear hybrid systems. In all the experimens we used
MATLAB 2015b on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @3.6 GHZ with 16 GB
memory processor with Windows Server 2012 R2 Standard OS.
Example 1. The first example models the motion of a billiard ball. The ball is
initially placed at (x0, y0), and it is shot in direction a with speed v where a
is the throw angle with the x-axis. We assume there is no friction between the
table and the ball. When the ball hits the sides parallel to x-axis (lines y = 0, 2),
its velocity on the y-direction flips sign while the velocity in x-direction remains
unchanged. Also, when it hits the side x = 4, its velocity on the x-direction
flips sign and the velocity on the y-direction remains unchanged. That is, the
collisions of the ball with the table sides are perfect and no energy is lost. The
system can be modeled using a simple hybrid automaton, as shown in Fig (5).
Assume, we want to hit the ball such that it eventually falls in the hole
centered in (0.2, 1.6) with radius 0.1. The search is done over 3 Dimensions:
We allow the ball to be initially placed at [0, 0.2]2 and be shot using angle
a ∈ [30◦, 45◦] with v = 1. Starting from the initial condition (0.1, 0.1), and using
a = 48.5◦, the throwing process is refined using GD method. The trajectories
are shown in Fig (6) where we refined light gray trajectories to the darker ones.
Example 2. Our second example is a hybrid model of glycemic control in diabetic
patients taken from [25] in which they used feedback control strategies by [26]
and [27]. The variation of insulin glucose levels in diabetic patients is modeled
using the following equations:
Algorithm 1 Robustness Gradient Descent algorithm
Require: Hybrid system model H, initial condition and input x0 and u, sets of
possible initial conditions and input values X0 and U , system specification
ϕ, finial time T , step size h, maximum number of iterations we descend k1,
maximum number of iterations we decrease the step size k2 and the multiplier
of the step size p < 1.
Ensure: local optimal initial condition x∗0, local optimal input u
∗ and the re-
lated optimal robustness value r∗
1: (x′0, u
′, r∗) ← (x0, u0,∞)
2: for i = 1 to k1 do
3: (r, t∗, ns, px0 , pu) ← Simul&Sens&GetRob(x′0, u′,H, T, ϕ)
4: if r ≤ r∗ then
5: (x0, u) ← (x′0, u′), (x∗0, u∗, r∗) ← (x′0, u′, r)
6: else
7: h′←h
8: for j = 1 to k2 do
9: h′ ← h′.p
10: (x′0, u
′) ← inbox(x0, u,X0, U0, h′, dx, du)
11: (r, t∗, ns, px0 , pu) ← Simul&Sens&GetRob(x′0, u′,H, T, ϕ)
12: if r ≤ r∗ then
13: (x∗0, u
∗, r∗) ← (x′0, u′, r)
14: Break
15: end if
16: end for
17: end if
18: (dx, du) ← GD(t∗, ns, px0 , pu).
19: (x′0, u
′) ← inbox(x0, u,X0, U0, h, dx, du)
20: end for G˙X˙
I˙
 =
−p1G−X(G+GB) + u1(t)−p2X + p3I
−n(I + Ib) + u2(t)vI
 (20)
where the state G is the level of glucose in the blood above the basal value
GB = 4.5, X is proportional to the insulin level that is effective in glucose level
control, and I is the insulin level above the value Ib = 15. Typical parameter
values for p2, VI , and n are 0.025, 12 and 0.093, respectively, and parameters p1
and p3 are patient dependent. The functions u1(t) and u2(t) model the infusion
of glucose and insulin into the bloodstream in order to control their levels, and
their values are chosen based on the following equations:
u1(t) =
{
1 + 2G(t)
9
G(t) < 6
50
3
G(t) ≥ 6 , u2(t) =

t
60
t ≤ 30
120−t
180
30 ≤ t ≤ 120
0 t ≥ 120
Using the above control schemes for u1(t) and u2(t) yields a hybrid automaton
with 6 locations/modes with 4 timed-based and 6 state-based guards. While the
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Fig. 5: Billiard ball hy-
brid automaton.
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Fig. 6: Starting in the white box and using a ∈
[30◦, 45◦], the ball should be placed in the red
hole. The red arrows show the descent direction.
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Fig. 7: Falsification of the specification ϕ1 for the glycemic control model
sensitivity-states px0 and pu go under jumps during the state-based transitions,
they remain unchanged in timed transitions. Note that based on Eq. (17) and
(19), in timed transitions, D1g and as a result τx0 =
∂τ
∂x0
and τu =
∂τ
∂u are zero.
In this example the search is over 5 dimensions: [G,X, I] ∈ [6, 9.5]× [0.15, 0.18]×
[−0.1, 0.1] and p1 ∈ [0, 0.02] and p3 ∈ [10−5, 10−4]. The system should satisfy:
ϕ1 =2[0,30]G ∈ [−3, 10] ∧2[30,120]G ∈ [−1.5, 5.1] ∧2[120,200]G ∈ [2, 5]
Starting from x0 = (6.5, 0.17, 0), and using (p1, p3) = (0.01, 1.3 × 10−5) with
robustness 0.8287, the optimization process reduces the robustness to -0.0213
using x0 = (6.5001, 0.1506,−3.064 × 10−6), and (p1, p3) = (0.0097, 1 × 10−4)
which results in falsification of the requirement. Figure (7) shows the glucose
trajectories G(t) where the search is started using the light gray trajectories and
refined to the darker ones. Note that because of the local search property of the
method, for trajectories in this this local search, the effort is put on decreasing
the distance to the critical unsafe set, which is the set [5.1,∞) at the critical
time t∗ ∈ [30, 120].
Example 3. Our last example is a rotating planar vehicle. Consider the motion of
a rigid object on a plane that uses a pair of off-centered thrusters as the control
input. Since these thrusters are not aligned with the center of the mass, they will
create both translational and rotational motions on the vehicle [24]. (see Fig. 8
for a better illustration). The system is supposed to satisfy the requirement in
Eq. (21) which implies that the vehicle should avoid the unsafe sets U1 and U2
(shown in Fig. 10 with red boxes) and reaches the goal set G (shown with a blue
box) within the simulation time T = 10. Here (x1, x2) is the vehicle position.
ϕ2 = 2[0,10]¬((x1, x2) ∈ U1 ∨ (x1, x2) ∈ U2) ∧3[0,10](x1, x2) ∈ G (21)
The location-based dynamics of the vehicle are mentioned in Eq. (22), where
j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, x1, x2 are the positions along the x and y axis, x3 is the angle with
the x-axis and x4, x5 and x6 are their derivatives. The hybrid model consists
of 3 locations, where inv(l = 1) = {x|x1 < 4}, inv(l = 2) = {x|4 ≤ x1 ≤ 8},
and inv(l = 3) = {x|x1 > 8}. The guards are shown using dashed lines in Fig.
10. The unsafe sets have attractive non-centered forces in their corresponding
locations. In particular, U1 is located in location 2 and U2 is located in location
3. At location 1, s1(l = 1) = s2(l = 1) = 0, at location 2, s1(l = 2) = −1 and
s2(l = 2) = 0, and at location 3, s1(l = 3) = 0 and s2(l = 3) = −2. (α1, β1) and
(α2, β2) are the centers of U1 and U2, respectively.
x˙j
x˙4
x˙5
x˙6
 =

xj+3
0.1x4+Σi=1,2si(l)(x1−αi)+F1cos(x5)−F2sin(x5)
0.1x4+Σi=1,2si(l)(x2−βi)+F1sin(x5)−F2cos(x5)
− bIF1 + aIF2
 (22)
Our search is over the initial values in [0, 1] × [0.5, 1], and the input signals
F1(t), F2(t) ∈ [−1, 1]; other states are zero initially. Since the search over all
the continuous input signals is a search in infinite dimension, here, we used
piecewise constant inputs with 11 variables for each F1(t) and F2(t). So the
overall search is over 24 dimensions. We start our search from the trajectory
with x0 = (0.5, 0.6, 0, 0, 0, 0), and input signals F1(t) = 0.2, and F2(t) = 0.1 for
t ≤ 7.2 and F2(t) = −0.2 for t > 7.2. This trajectory satisfies (21) with the
robustness value equal to 0.2950. Using our method with step size h = 0.02,
in the 8th iteration, the initial condition x0 = (0.3983, 0.6948, 0, 0, 0, 0) and
the inputs shown in Fig (9) are chosen and the robustness is improved to the
value 0.8599 (Note that while in a falsification problem we try to decrease the
robustness value, in a related problem called satisfaction problem increasing the
robustness value is desired). he projection of the trajectories into the x1 − x2
plane is shown in Fig. 10, where dark gray trajectories are refined to light gray
ones. In Fig. 11, one can see that even if the trajectory from which we want to
descend does not enter the goal set location, we are still able to improve the
trajectory by descending toward the adjacent guard with the least distance from
that set.
In order to determine the effect of applying GD local search method to global
search methods like Simulated Annealing (SA), we performed a statistical study
in which we compare the combination of SA and GD (SA+GD) with SA only.
To combine SA and GD, we apply GD algorithm whenever the samples taken
by SA return a robustness value less than some threshold value rT .
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Fig. 8: The rigid body with
off centered thrusters. O is
the center of the mass but
the force is applied to O’.
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Fig. 11: Trajectories that do not enter
the goal set location (dashed trajecto-
ries here) can still improve by descend-
ing toward the guard set (dashed line
at x1 = 8).
In our experiment we ran SA and SA+GD for 150 times with equal total
number of samples N = 100 and rT = 2.5. We set the parameters in Alg. (1) to
k1 = 10, k2 = 2, h = 0.02 to automatically search for initial conditions and inputs
that satisfy the specification ϕ2 with U1 = [5.5, 6.5]× [2.5, 3.5], U2 = [9.5, 10.5]×
[1.5, 4.5], G = [12.5, 13] × [4.5, 5] for the system in Example (3). In order to
satisfy ϕ2, we try to falsify its negation ¬ϕ2. The results are shown in Table (1).
The improvement in finding falsifying trajectories is clear from the total number
of falsifications in the first row. Also, since GD gets a chance to improve the
performance only if SA finds a robustness value less than rT , we added the second
row which shows in how many percents of the cases falsification is achieved if
SA finds a robustness value less than rT . While average of the best robustness
value for all the tests is better for SA+GD algorithm, it is slightly better for
SA if we only consider non-falsified cases. We can conclude that even if SA finds
small robustness values, it is hardly able to further decrease it. As the constant
Table 1: Comparing SA and SA+GD results for the system of Example 3
Optim. method SA SA+GD
num. of total falsification 4/150 16/150
% of falsification if SA finds r ≤ rT 13.33% 39.02%
Avg. min-Rob. (all the cases) 9.1828 8.4818
Avg. min-Rob. (not falsified cases) 9.4278 9.4968
min. min-Rob. (not falsified cases) 0.0080 0.0059
max. min-Rob. (not falsified cases) 13.1424 13.0880
budget in the comparison is “equal total number of simulations”, we can claim
that SA+GD can help improve the results if simulations/experiments are costly.
Choosing different design parameters might lead to even better experimental
results.
6 Related Work
One possible categorization for falsification approaches divides them into Single
Shooting (SS) vs. Multiple Shooting (MS) methods. The technique of numeri-
cally solving boundary value problems is called shooting. SS approaches search
over the space of system trajectories initiated from the set of initial conditions
and under possible inputs. S-TaLiRo [22] and Breach [28] lie in this category.
In contrast, MS approaches create approximate trajectories from trajectory seg-
ments starting from multiple initial conditions (not necessarily inside the initial
set). Hence, the trajectories contain gaps between segments. The works [7,8] fall
in in this category. MS techniques cannot handle general TL requirements.
Motion planning approaches such as Rapidly-exploring Random Trees (RRT)
lie in a category between SS and MS approaches. Starting from an initial con-
dition, the tree grows toward the unsafe set (or vice versa) to find an unsafe
behavior of a non-autonomous system [11,9]. The applicability of these methods,
however, is limited since it depends on many factors such as the dimensionality
of the system, the modeling language, and the local planner.
Another possible categorization of falsification methods divides them into the
following categories:
1. Methods that rely on optimizing a metric (called robustness) to systemat-
ically search for falsification: These methods try to minimize a robustness
value which is assigned to each trajectory using global optimization tech-
niques like SA and Cross Entropy. S-TaLiRo [22] and Breach [28] are among
the tools that use this strategy.
2. Methods that use constraint solvers to find falsification by translating the
problem into constraint solving using Bounded Model Checking (BMC) ap-
proaches [29]. However, these approaches discretize the continuous dynamics
and the resulting constraints become nonlinear even for linear hybrid systems
by involving higher order terms, and,
3. Motion planning approaches such as Rapidly-exploring Random Trees (RRT):
These methods lie in SS approach category where starting from an initial
condition the tree grows toward the unsafe set (or vice versa) to find an
unsafe behavior of a non-autonomous system [11]. The applicability of these
methods, however, is limited since it depends on many factors such as system
behavior itself and the used planner.
The performance of SS falsification methods can be improved using different
complementary directions. One direction is to provide alternative TL robustness
metrics [30]. Another direction is to compute guaranteed or approximate descent
directions [17,23] in order to utilize descent optimization methods. Our method
in this paper is a SS approach that uses optimization and robustness metric to
solve the falsification problem. In [23,14] robustness-based falsification is guided
using descent direction; however, that line of work is only applicable to purely
continuous systems. In [31], descent direction is calculated in the case of linear
hybrid systems using optimization methods.
In [8] authors use a MS approach to find falsifying trajectories of a hybrid
system. Providing the gradient information to an NLP solver, they try to re-
duce the gaps between segments. Like our approach, they require knowledge of
the system dynamics and solve a local search problem. Unlike our method, in
their approach, falsifying trajectories are segmented trajectories which are not
real system trajectories unless the gaps between segments become zero in the
optimization procedure (for systems with identity reset maps), which may not
be the case, in general. As a result, falsification cannot be concluded unless they
can randomly find a neighboring real system trajectory that violates the speci-
fication. We think that our approach can help their method to effectively search
over real trajectories neighboring the segmented trajectory. Furthermore, the
specifications they have focused on in [8] are safety properties and because of
the nature of the search, their method cannot easily be extended to search for
system trajectories that falsify general MTL formulas.
The general idea of using sensitivity to explore the parameter space of a prob-
lem that deals with robustness of a TL formula was first introduced in [32]. To
solve a verification problem, they propose using the sensitivity of a robustness
function to a parameter assuming that the function is differentiable to that pa-
rameter. There are however multiple factors which result in non-differentiability
of the robustness function with respect to a parameter: First of all, the predi-
cates themselves might be non smooth and non-differentiable. Secondly, hybrid
systems may have non smooth and non-differentiable trajectories. Finally, logical
operators in the TL formula impose min and max operators to robustness func-
tion. The paper suggests using left and right hand derivatives for dealing with
min and max operators, but it does not propose solutions for the first two cases.
In our framework, by introducing Eq. (7), we solve the non differentiability issue
in the first case and the analysis in Sec. 4 deals with this issue in the second case.
Also, the problem we try to solve is a different problem (a falsification problem).
In [33], a smooth infinitely differentiable robustness function is introduced
which solves – to some extent – the non-differentiability problem of the robust-
ness function to parameters. In the case of hybrid systems however, we still deal
with this problem as the non-differentiability is caused by the system model
rather than the robustness function itself. In the future, we will investigate if
the results in [33] could further improve the performance of gradient descent
falsification methods as formulated in our work.
In [34], an algorithm to approximate reachable sets using sensitivity analysis
is introduced. Sensitivity of hybrid systems without reset maps is used to verify
safety properties. Like all approaches that try to solve a coverage problem, the
method suffers from the state explosion issue which happens when one tries to
cover the high dimensional spaces induced by the variables in the input signal
parameterization. Our framework solves a different problem and it is applicable
to hybrid systems with reset maps under general TL formulas. Furthermore, as
we are not solving a coverage problem, we do not face the state explosion issue.
7 Conclusion
TL robustness guided falsification [10] has shown great potential in terms of black
or gray box automatic test case generation for CPS [35,36,37]. In this paper, we
presented a method that locally improves the search for falsifying behaviors by
computing descent directions for the TL robustness in the search space of the
falsification problem. Our proposed method computes such descent directions for
non-linear hybrid systems with external inputs, which was not possible before
in the literature. Using examples, we demonstrated that our framework locally
decreases the TL robustness at each iteration. Furthermore, our preliminary
statistical results indicate that it is possible to improve a global test-based falsi-
fication framework when the proposed local gradient descent method is utilized.
Currently, the proposed framework requires a symbolic representation of the
non-linear dynamics and the switching conditions of the hybrid automaton in
order to compute the descent direction. As future research, we expect that we can
relax this requirement by numerically computing approximations to the descent
directions similarly to our work for smooth non-linear dynamical systems [17].
This will enable the application of the local descent method to a wide range of
Simulink models without explicit extraction of the system dynamics.
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